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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-2095 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SEAN N. HEALY, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00319-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL and AMBRO,  Circuit Judges  
and JONES, II,* District Judge. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 17, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Sean Healy appeals his criminal sentence, contending that it was  
procedurally and substantively unreasonable for a number of reasons.  Healy failed to 
__________________ 
 
* The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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raise the objections he now raises before us at the sentencing hearing; therefore, we 
review the sentence for plain error.  United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 404 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We will affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Healy executed a Ponzi-type scheme between 2003 and 2009 that defrauded 
seventy-two people out of approximately $16 million.  After one investor discovered 
Healy’s scheme, he filed a civil suit against Healy and alerted the United States 
Attorney’s Office in Harrisburg to the potentially criminal activity.   
 Healy was deposed in connection with the civil litigation.  During the deposition, 
he made false statements concerning investments he made on behalf of his clients.  Healy 
also created fraudulent records to prove he was making sound investments for them.  In 
addition to providing the fraudulent records to the plaintiffs during the course of the civil 
litigation, Healy provided the fraudulent records to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Harrisburg.  In turn, those records were provided to the grand jury in connection with 
their investigation of Healy’s activities with Pennsylvania investors. 
 On October 9, 2009, Healy was indicted on multiple counts of wire fraud, mail 
fraud, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, and obstruction of justice.  
Healy made his initial appearance on October 15, 2009, and entered a plea of not guilty.  
He was released on bail subject to various conditions, including refraining from the use 
of drugs or other controlled substances.  At this time, Healy tested positive for cocaine 
and amphetamines.  A probation officer asked Healy about recent drug use, and Healy 
responded that he had not ingested illegal drugs for the past six months.   
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 Pursuant to a plea agreement, on November 23, 2009, Healy entered a guilty plea 
on three counts: counts two, sixteen and twenty-four of the indictment.  Counts two and 
sixteen charged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), and count twenty-four 
charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (money laundering).  Under the terms of the plea 
agreement, at the sentencing hearing the Government would recommend a sentence of 
121 months’ imprisonment, the calculation of which included a 3-point reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual.     
 On two subsequent occasions, Healy tested positive for cocaine.  At his bail 
revocation hearing in January 2010, Healy denied using cocaine any time after he initially 
pled not guilty, but did admit to using cocaine a few days prior to his initial appearance.  
The District Court revoked Healy’s bail. 
 The Probation Office’s presentence report (“PSR”) recommended a sentence of 
188-235 months’ imprisonment, the calculation of which included a 2-point enhancement 
for obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1, and specifically did not include an 
acceptance of responsibility credit pursuant to § 3E1.1.  This sentence was calculated 
properly under the Guidelines.
1
  The PSR recommended the obstruction of justice 
enhancement based on Healy’s false deposition testimony in connection with the civil 
suit and his providing false records to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  The PSR declined to 
                                              
1
 The Guidelines calculation was as follows: § 2B1.1(a)(1) (base offense level for wire 
fraud): 7; § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) (financial loss): 20; § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (number of victims 
greater than fifty): 4; § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) (use of sophisticated means): 2; § 2S1.1(b)(2)(A) 
(conviction under § 1957): 1; § 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice): 2.  Total offense level: 36.  
For an offense level of 36 and criminal history category of I, the Guidelines recommend a 
sentence of 188-235 months’ imprisonment. 
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recommend an acceptance of responsibility credit because “the defendant obstructed 
justice and, while on pretrial release, twice tested positive for the presence of cocaine.” 
(PSR ¶ 30.) 
 At the sentencing hearing on March 31, 2010, neither the Government nor Healy 
objected to any of the facts found in the PSR, and the District Court adopted the PSR 
without change.  Healy asked the District Court to sentence him to 121 months’ 
imprisonment, as set forth in the plea agreement.  The District Court declined to do so, 
and sentenced Healy to 188 months’ imprisonment, restitution in the amount of 
approximately $16 million, three years supervised release, and a $300 assessment.     
 Healy timely appealed his sentence on April 12, 2010.   
Discussion 
 
 Healy raises three arguments to support his contention that the 188-month 
sentence was procedurally unreasonable.  First, he contends that it was procedurally 
unreasonable to enhance the sentence for obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the 
Guidelines.  Second, he contends that it was procedurally unreasonable not to apply the 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1.  Third, he contends that it 
was procedurally unreasonable because the District Court failed to consider meaningfully 
the defendant’s history and characteristics as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).2  Next, 
Healy asserts that the 188-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.  All of these 
contentions are without merit. 
                                              
2
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) provides that a sentencing court shall consider, among other 
factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant.” 
5 
 
 When reviewing sentences for procedural reasonableness, we will find procedural 
error if the district court has erred by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the 
Guidelines range.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
 The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement:  Healy contends that applying the 
obstruction of justice enhancement was procedurally unreasonable because the fact 
supporting its application – false testimony in a civil deposition – occurred prior to the 
start of the Government’s investigation.  But Healy fails to acknowledge that the 
obstruction enhancement was also based on his supplying false documents to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, which were considered by the grand jury.   
 Section 3C1.1 provides that “obstructive conduct that occurred prior to the start of 
the investigation of the instant offense of conviction may be covered by this guideline if 
the conduct was purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation or 
prosecution of the offense of conviction.”  § 3C1.1, n.1.  Furthermore, the commentary 
includes as examples of conduct that warrants application of this enhancement both 
“producing or attempting to produce a false, altered, or counterfeit document or record 
during an official investigation or judicial proceeding” and “committing, suborning, or 
attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil proceeding if such 
perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction.”  Id. at n.4.  
Both Healy’s false testimony in the civil deposition and providing false documents to the 
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U.S. Attorney’s Office fall squarely within these examples.  Accordingly, the District 
Court did not commit plain error when applying the obstruction of justice enhancement. 
 The Acceptance of Responsibility Credit:  Healy contends that the District Court 
should have applied the acceptance of responsibility credit because his having twice 
tested positive for cocaine and obstructed justice prior to commencement of the 
investigation does not form a proper basis upon which to deny it.   
 The Guidelines state that “conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1  
ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal 
conduct.”  § 3E1.1, n.4.  This note alone provides an adequate basis upon which to deny 
Healy the credit.  Furthermore, illegal drug use is also an appropriate reason to deny the 
credit.  See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding positive 
drug tests may be considered by the sentencing judge when deciding whether to grant the 
acceptance of responsibility credit).  Accordingly, the District Court did not commit plain 
error in declining to apply the acceptance of responsibility credit. 
 Consideration of Healy’s History and Characteristics:  Healy contends that the 
District Court did not meaningfully consider the § 3553(a) factors because it ignored 
some of his characteristics, namely his continued need for medical and psychological 
treatment and his cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Commission in forfeiting 
assets to compensate victims. 
 The district court need not discuss and make a finding as to each of the § 3553(a) 
factors if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into account in sentencing. 
The district court need neither raise every relevant issue on its own during sentencing, 
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nor must it discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without 
merit.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 First, the District Court was aware that the SEC possessed much of Healy’s assets.  
See App. 185a (“It is the understanding that the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission is in possession of all items seized and/or forfeited . . . .”).  Second, the PSR 
discussed extensively Healy’s medical history, and the District Court based its sentence 
on the findings in the PSR by adopting it without change.  The District Court furthermore 
considered the fact that Healy had a difficult childhood, a family, and bipolar disorder 
when deciding on the appropriate sentence.  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
commit plain error because it meaningfully considered Healy’s history and 
characteristics. 
 Substantive Reasonableness:  Healy contends that his sentence is substantively 
unreasonable because the District Court applied the obstruction of justice enhancement, 
declined to apply the acceptance of responsibility credit, and did not consider 
meaningfully his history and characteristics.  He also argues that the District Court’s 
failure to follow the Government’s 121-month sentence recommendation was 
substantively unreasonable. 
 If the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, this Court will affirm it 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.  United States v. Tomko, 
562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Sentences falling within the advisory 
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Guidelines range are more likely to be reasonable than those falling outside of that range. 
United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Here, the District Court’s Statement of Reasons adequately explained why it 
decided on a 188-month sentence, which was at the lower end of the sentencing range.  
The District Court adopted the PSR in full, which provided additional support for the 
188-month sentence.  Furthermore, the District Court was under no obligation to follow 
the 121-month sentence recommendation in the plea agreement.  Accordingly, the 
sentence was substantively reasonable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
